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Abstract
The primary purpose of encouraging direct foreign investment is to
achieve the transfer of technology and capital. The ultimate aim is
to achieve technological and industrial development and to attain
self-sufficiency.
The recent case of IBM-India highlights this quest for tech-
nological development and self-sufficiency with respect to the com-
puter industry in India. Although there has been discussion con-
cerning cost-benefit analysis with respect to multinational investment
both for the multinational corporation and the host countries,
research studies have been inconclusive.
This study attempts to analyze the costs incurred and the benefits
realized by both IBM and India during the pre- and post-withdrawal
periods. The purpose of the study is to examine the costs and bene-
fits with respect to the Government of India's decision to deny IBM
100 percent equity, and IBM's subsequent decision to withdraw from
India.
The study concludes that the Government of India did succeed
during the post-withdrawal period in securing effective participation
in the ownership and control of Indian subsidiaries of foreign com-
puter companies. Further, changes in the structure of the computer
market in India indicate that the goal of self-sufficiency was
achieved during the post-withdrawal period. Lastly, the Indian com-
puter firms that emerged to fill the void created by the departure of
IBM have narrowed the technology gap that existed between Indian and
foreign computer firms.

Quest for Self-Suf f iciency in Technological Development:
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Withdrawal of IBM from India
Introduction
The drive toward self-sufficiency, and the quest for technological
and industrial development, have led many developing countries to
attract foreign direct investment. The purpose of foreign direct
investment is to achieve the transfer of technology, capital, and
managerial skills. However, many developing countries, including
Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico and Peru, to name a few, have pursued
the goal of attaining self-sufficiency primarily through domestic
development. These nation states have used foreign direct investment
as a catalyst in the development process.
The recent case of IBM in India highlights this quest for tech-
nological and industrial development by the Government of India. IBM's
entry into the Indian market in 1952, the multinational firm's with-
drawal from India in 1978, and the recent reinstatement of a close
working relationship, provide a unique opportunity to study the impact
of foreign direct investment.
The purpose of this study is to examine the costs and benefits of
the IBM-India episode. The costs and benefits to both players,
arising from the Government of India's decision to deny IBM permission
to retain 100 percent equity, and IBM's subsequent decision to with-
draw from India, are explored.
IBM-India Case
Background . IBM commended operations in India in 1952. The bulk of
IBM's total revenues was derived from commercial or trading activities,
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and low-technology manufacturing operations. These activities included
the leasing of data processing machines, the operations of IBM service
bureaus, and the manufacture of IBM cards. However, the leasing of
IBM data processing machines included maintenance, systems engi-
neering, education, and other services.
During this period, the Government of India surveyed the Indian
operations of foreign-owned and foreign-controlled operations. These
firms were making excessively high profits and repatriating large
amounts of capital. In addition, they were stifling domestic com-
petition and competing for scarce capital with domestic firms. Fur-
ther, they were transferring technology that was either obsolete or of
minor importance for industrial development.
In 1966 and 1968, the Government of India advised IBM to share
ownership of its local operations with Indian nationals. IBM explained
that its independent international operations required centralized
coordination and control. This precluded sharing ownership with
domestic entrepreneurs. Indeed, in 1968 IBM advised the government
that it would terminate its operations in India rather than share
ownership of its Indian subsidiary. The Government of India decided
to let IBM retain full control over its operations. However, changes
in the environment altered the relationship between IBM and the
Government of India.
During the 1970s the rise of European and Japanese multinational
corporations provided host country governments with alternative means
to secure managerial and technological know-how, capital, and a market
network. The availability of alternative methods to fulfill national
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goals, in line with existing national priorities, reduced the level of
dependence of developing countries on U.S. multinational corporations.
Taking stock of its developmental priorities and increased bar-
gaining strength, the Government of India formalized its desire to
influence the course of foreign direct investment in India. The pri-
mary objective was to ensure that foreign direct investment in India
fell in line with the nation's developmental priorities. The means
adopted to achieve this objective was the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act (FERA), which was legislated on January 1, 1974.
The FERA affected all foreign companies with foreign equity ex-
ceeding 40 percent. According to FERA, four levels of foreign equity
participation were permitted. First, all trading companies engaged in
purely commercial activities and manufacturing enterprises utilizing
"non-sophisticated" technology were required to reduce their foreign
equity to 40 percent. Second, "high technology" companies, utilizing
"sophisticated" technology and/or engaged in "special" activities, as
designated by the Government of India, were permitted to retain a
foreign equity holding of 74 percent. A third intermediate level of
51 percent foreign equity was established for multi-activity companies
engaged in both sophisticated technology fields and other commercial
and trading activities. The fourth level of 100 percent foreign
equity was permitted only in those instances where foreign firms were
engaged in purely export activities.
IBM Withdrawal . The Reserve Bank of India analyzed IBM's activities
and past financial details, based upon the FERA guidelines. Based on
this analysis they concluded that IBM-India had to dilute its foreign
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equity to 40 percent. The Government of India contended that IBM was
importing second-hand machines (IBM Systems 1401) into India at very
low old book values. These second-hand machines were reconditioned
and either leased or sold in India. In the event the reconditioned
machines were leased, IBM's standardized worldwide lease rental rates
were charged. IBM charged for reconditioned sold units its standard-
ized worldwide sale price. Further, it was alleged that IBM was re-
patriating the resulting unduly high profits while not providing
transfer of any sophisticated technology.
In addition, the Government of India contended that IBM had
repatriated additional hidden profits to the parent company. These
alleged hidden profits were considered by IBM as legitimate head-
quarter expenses. According to IBM, these headquarter expenses
reflected administrative overhead expenses, research and development
expenditures, and other expenses incurred by the parent organization.
These headquarter expenses were based upon the particular affiliate's
revenues. The Government of India argued that India did not benefit
from the research and development by virtue of its contribution to
IBM's headquarter expenses. However, IBM claimed that IBM-India had
the potential to sell any and all of the new products at the time they
were introduced by IBM. The concept of charging headquarter expenses
to IBM-India was based upon the right to receive, rather than what
actually had been received and sold.
In response to the Reserve Bank of India notification of November
1975, IBM submitted a formal counter-proposal in April 1976. This
counter-proposal essentially involved the division of its activities
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in India into two companies. According to this counter-proposal, IBM
would reduce its equity to 40 percent in the first company covering
the operations of its four data centers. However, IBM would retain
100 percent equity in the second company that would be engaged in
exports, the supply of computer systems, and the provision of services,
Further, IBM proposed to convert its existing manufacturing activity
to 100 percent export by March 1978, to conform with FERA guidelines.
IBM's counter-proposal underwent the scrutiny of the FERA com-
mittee. Based upon their review of the counter-proposal, the FERA
committee concluded that no exception to FERA could be made in IBM's
case. This decision was communicated to IBM in November 1977. The
final order from the Reserve Bank, of India directed IBM to reduce its
foreign equity holding to 40 percent, as per the FERA guidelines, in
order to continue its business operations in India.
Faced with this directive from the Reserve Bank of India, IBM
reluctantly decided to phase out its operations in India in November
1977. IBM parts used in maintenance, and tools and test equipment,
were sold under agreement to Computer Maintenance Corporation, a
state-owned enterprise. The computing centers and card manufacturing
facilities were sold to International Data Management Private Limited,
a firm set up by 200 IBM employees. IBM ceased operations in India on
May 28, 1978.
Recent Developments . In recent years, the Government of India has
set new priorities with regard to the development and modernization of
Indian industry through rapid development of the electronics sector in
2
general, and the computer industry in particular. The new computer
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policy, which featured import liberalization and other radical
3
measures, was announced on November 19, 1984.
As a result of this policy, both the current size and potential
growth rate of the computer market in India have attracted a large
number of overseas manufacturers. Production in the computer, control
and instrumentation sector of the electronics industry has risen from
a level of Rs. 3290 million (approximately U.S. $300 million) in 1983
to Rs . 4270 million (approximately U.S. $400 million) in 1984, regis-
tering a growth rate of about 30 percent. The annual production
levels in the computer, control and instrumentation sector from 1978
to 1984, and the corresponding growth rates, are summarized in Table 1,
The total production of electronics in India in 1984 was of the
order of Rs. 18,900 million (approximately U.S. $1,800 million), com-
pared to Rs . 13,600 million (approximately U.S. $1,300 million) in
1983, and Rs . 12,050 million (approximately U.S. $1,200 million) in
1982. As shown in Table 2, the growth rate of production in the
electronics industry climbed from a modest 12.9 percent during the
previous year to a substantial 39 percent.
The rapidly growing computer market in India and the availability
of computer systems and software development skills have attracted
many computer manufacturers. Other factors that attracted IBM to the
Indian computer market included the recent signing of a Memorandum of
Understanding between the U.S. and India, and the easing of restric-
tions by the Government of India. In addition, the slump in the U.S.
computer market and the maturing of several overseas computer markets
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Table 1
Production in the Computer, Control and Instrumentation Sector
Year Annual Production Growth Rate
(Rs. in Million)
1978 1190
1979 1310 10.1
1980 1600 22.1
1981 2010 25.6
1982 2420 20.4
1983 3290 36.0
1984 ' 4270 29.8
Source: Department of Electronics, Government of India.
Various annual reports.
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Table 2
Production in the Electronics Industry in India
Year Annual Production
(Rs. in Million)
Growth Rate
(Percent)
12.,5
24.,4
15.,8
9,.5
24.,7
15.,4
29.,5
12.,9
39,.0
48,.4
32,.3
38,.8
38,.7
39,.1
1976 4100
1977 5100
1978 5905
1979 6465
1980 8060
1981 9300
1982 12050
1983 13600
1984 18900
iy85 (estimated) 30650
1986 (estimated) 40550
1987 (estimated) 56300
1988 (estimated) 78100
1989 (estimated) 108600
Source: Department of Electronics, Government of India.
Various annual reports.
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induced IBM and other computer manufacturers to seek new overseas
markets for both offensive and defensive strategic purposes.
In response to the above trends, IBM has reentered the Indian
market in recent months and secured contracts for computer systems for
the Indian railroads, oil and gas consortium, and to set up a national
data communications network. — — •—
Cost-Benefit Analysis
An attempt is made to examine the costs and benefits of the IBM-
India episode described in the preceding section. Recent developments
in the computer industry in India and the changing nature of the IBM-
India relationship are explored. The costs incurred and the benefits
realized by each party will be assessed prior to and subsequent to the
withdrawal of IBM from India.
The following cost-benefit analysis of the IBM-India episode
begins with a summary of the priorities and goals of both IBM and the
Government of India. An understanding of the priorities and objec-
tives of both IBM and the Government of India is necessary in order to
assess the outcome of their policies and strategic responses.
Priorities and Objectives . IBM commenced operations in India with
the primary long-term objectives of achieving growth, securing a
sizable market share, and maintaining international competitiveness in
the world computer and information systems market. Entry into the new
and growing Indian computer market helped IBM to sustain and improve
upon their rapid growth rate while improving their international com-
petitiveness. IBM was attracted to India by the availability of low-
cost skilled labor for its manufacturing operations. In addition, IBM
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was aware of the availability of considerable software development and
computer systems consultant skills in India. These skills are used to
develop software and provide high-skill services, such as systems
engineering and education for overseas IBM companies in and around
South-East Asia.
The Government of India, on the other hand, had three stated goals
in regard to its drive toward self-sufficiency of the computer indus-
try in India. First, Indian participation was sought in the ownership
and control of the foreign computer subsidiaries in the country.
Second, wholly-Indian producers were to satisfy most of India's com-
puter needs. Foreign computer firms were to supply only very large
computer systems using very advanced technology. Third, access to and
participation in the manufacture of the most advanced computer systems
4
available was sought by the Government of India.
The following cost-benefit analysis is conducted in the light of
the policy and strategic objectives of IBM and the Government of India.
The performance of IBM and India are evaluated during the pre- and
post-withdrawal periods. The former period extends from the middle
1960s to 1977, and the latter extends from early 1978 to the present.
Pre-Withdrawal Performance of IBM . IBM is a classic growth com-
pany and is considered the leading producer of advanced electronic
computing equipment in the world. Thomas J. Watson, the late founder
of IBM, set the firm on its global expansion path with the motto
"World peace through world trade." With great vision and foresight,
IBM cultivated foreign markets since World War I. After World War II,
IBM's foreign operations were set up as a wholly owned but independently
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administered subsidiary, known as IBM World Trade Corporation. By
1960, IBM World Trade Corporation had operations in 87 countries, of
which 36 were served by nationally incorporated firms. In 1976, IBM
operations expanded and covered 125 countries with 300,000 employees,
half of whom were foreign nationals. From the mid-1960s, foreign
operations have accounted for approximately 50 percent of IBM's total
revenues and earnings. This strategic overseas thrust enabled IBM to
prosper even when the vast domestic computer market first matured and
later exhibited symptoms of decline.
Soon after entering the Indian market in 1952, IBM rapidly estab-
lished a good reputation. A dominant market share was secured for
typewriters, adding machines, data processing equipment, and computers.
Indeed, IBM achieved a 70 percent market share of the Indian office
machine market by the early 1970s. This dominant position was achieved
through technological superiority and a demonstrated commitment to
after-sale service and maintenance. However, only simple manufacturing
operations were based in India, while high technology and export manu-
facturing facilities were located elsewhere. India was seen primarily
as a market for sales and service.
The wholly-owned Indian subsidiary contributed only 0.07 percent
to IBM's total net income. During the 1952-1977 period, IBM installed
nearly 1000 computer systems in India. These computer systems were
mostly Systems 1401, reconditioned at the Bombay manufacturing plant.
At one point, the Indian subsidiary manufactured a medium-sized com-
puter with 20 percent local content for the domestic market. In
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addition, an inexpensive keypunch machine with 70 percent local con-
tent was manufactured for export.
The profits generated by the Indian subsidiary were miniscule in
relation to IBM's worldwide profits. However, IBM had secured a
strong foothold in a market that was still in its embryonic stage.
Besides, these profits resulted from reconditioned second-hand
machines, relatively simple manufacturing operations, service and
maintenance. Tight control over IBM's operations ensured that the
latest advances in computer technology were not released to existing
and potential competitors. In addition, IBM could use India as a com-
petence center for computer systems consultant skills and software
development, and as a base for exporting goods and services. The
entire Asian region, which was developing and had future growth poten-
tial, could be served from India.
In entering the Indian computer market, IBM sought to derive a
number of potential benefits. First, IBM could achieve an adequate,
or an above normal, rate of return on its investment in India. Second,
IBM could maintain and even improve its market share and competitive
position in the world computer market. Third, risk reduction through
diversification could be achieved by expanding into the Indian com-
puter market, which was not perfectly linked to its existing operations
or markets. Fourth, IBM expected to achieve and sustain a high rate
of growth, as the computer industry in India passed through its growth
phase. Fifth, IBM may have been able to tap new capital markets,
thereby obtaining access to possibly lower cost capital and a more
diversified source of funds.
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Further, IBM could take advantage of the considerable software
development and computer systems consultant skills available in India.
Indeed, it is common knowledge that during the last 25 years, trained
Indian managers have been widely used in South-East Asia for setting up
computer systems, developing software, and managing computer firms.
Some IBM-trained Indian managers have set up and expanded their own
computer firms, such as Hindustan Computers, which is thriving in
Australia and Singapore.
Offsetting the above benefits, IBM faced several potential costs
associated with its Indian subsidiary operations. First, there was
the possible higher cost of production or doing business in a foreign
country located on the other side of the globe. Second, there was a
higher business risk associated with operating in a foreign environ-
ment. Third, there existed the possibility of expropriation and
forced sale of equity to local partners at lower than economic value.
Indeed, IBM was in effect directed to reduce its equity to 40 percent
if it wishes to continue its operations in India.
i
. Fourth, IBM faced possible restrictions on repatriation of income
and capital as well as other forms of interference by the Government
of India. A recent report indicated that IBM profits and assets are
still frozen in India. IBM's profits are being held on deposit with
several banks in India, including Citibank and the Bank of America.
A fifth cost was the risk of incurring losses because of exchange
rate fluctuations. Sixth, there was the higher cost of compensating
expatriate management personnel or the additional cost of training
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Indian nationals. Seventh, IBM faced transportation costs and border
taxes incurred in transferring men, materials and capital overseas.
An eighth disadvantage was the possibility of creating and nur-
turing future competitors. Hindustan Computers, which is operating in
Singapore and Australia, was founded by an IBM-trained Indian manager.
Yet another cost incurred by IBM was the potential deterioration in
relations with U.S. labor unions. The labor unions, as a general
rule, oppose the creation of overseas jobs at the cost of jobs at
home.
Based on the above cost-benefit analysis of the pre-withdrawal
phase of IBM's operations in India, it appears that the benefits to
IBM outweighed the costs. Having examined the costs and benefits
associated with IBM's operations in India during the pre-withdrawal
period, India's performance during the same period is reviewed next.
Pre-Withdrawal Performance of India . The performance of the
Indian computer industry is evaluated in terms of the three stated
goals of ownership participation and control, self-sufficiency, and
technology transfer. The degree to which these goals were met during
the pre- and post-withdrawal periods is examined.
In 1966, two overseas computer firms had sales and manufacturing
activities in India. These firms were IBM and Britain's International
Computers and Tabulators (ICT), which in 1968 became a part of Inter-
national Computers Limited (ICL).
As discussed earlier, the Government of India was unsuccessful in
its initial attempts to induce IBM, in 1966 and 1968, to share owner-
ship of its local activities with Indian nationals. ICL, by contrast,
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had split its operations into two units, one for manufacturing and the
other for sales. The manufacturing unit involved 40 percent Indian
ownership, thereby indicating that ICL was sensitive to the policy
objectives of the Government of India. However, the sales unit was
appointed as the sole distributor of the manufactured products and
made all decisions about the operations of the manufacturing unit,
thereby retaining control.
Based on the above, it appears that the Government of India was
unable to ensure effective Indian participation in the ownership and
control of the Indian subsidiaries of foreign computer firms during
this period. However, the negotiating position of the Government of
India was strengthened as a result of changes that were taking place
in the international business world.
In the 1970s, European and Japanese multinational companies and
state-owned enterprises entered the international business arena.
These newcomers provided host country governments with alternative
means to secure managerial and technological know-how, capital, and a
market network. The availability of alternative methods to fulfill
national goals, in line with existing priorities, reduced the level of
dependence of host country governments on U.S. multinational firms
such as IBM.
Many other developments in the international data processing
industry worked in favor of India during the 1970s. The emergence of
minicomputers and microcomputers, built with increasingly powerful and
less expensive components, provided an alternative mode of development,
These components could be imported and used as inputs in computer
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systems designed in India. Moreover, these components were becoming
available from an increasing number of suppliers that were primary
suppliers of components and not computer systems. The number of
foreign computer firms that India could rely upon had increased during
the 1970s. As a result, there was a higher probability that India
could establish linkages with one or more foreign computer firms on
favorable terms.
Taking advantage of its stronger negotiating position, the Govern-
ment of India again urged IBM, in 1973-1974, to share its equity in
its Indian operations with Indian nationals. In response, IBM offered
new and higher levels of manufacturing activities that could generate
export earnings and stimulate the transfer of technology. In addi-
tion, IBM offered direct technical assistance to India's data pro-
cessing programs in exchange for an exemption from the Government of
India's equity-sharing policy. Further, IBM again indicated that it
would withdraw from India rather than be compelled to share ownership
and control of its Indian operations. However, the Government of
India decided to press its demands on equity-sharing and IBM sub-
sequently withdrew from India.
ICL, in contrast, agreed to merge its two units after intense
negotiations with the Government of India. In addition, ICL agreed to
dilute its equity to 40 percent, thereby ensuring Indian participation
in both the marketing and manufacturing activities. Moreover, the
Government of India resisted Burroughs 's efforts to establish a wholly-
owned subsidiary. Later in 1977, Burroughs agreed to establish a
joint venture with Tata Enterprises. Thus, in contrast to the 1960s,
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the Government of India achieved its first policy objective. Indian
nationals were participating in the ownership and control of Indian
subsidiaries of foreign computer firms.
The Government of India's second computer goal was the fostering
of indigenous sources of supply for most of the nation's computer needs.
In the six years following the announcement of the computer goals in
1966, the country made no progress toward encouragement of indigenous
computer suppliers. IBM was the source of almost 75 percent of all
systems installed between 1967 and 1972. As shown in Table 3, this
dominant market share was not less than IBM had secured from 1960 to
1966, before India's national computer policy was implemented.
The only Indian computer enterprise, for most of the 1970s, was
the central government's Electronics Corporation of India Limited.
This Indian enterprise was the source of only 8.5 percent of all
systems installed between 1967 and 1972. However, between 1973 and
1977, the Electronics Corporation of India Limited became the single
largest supplier of computer systems in India. As depicted in Table
3, IBM's market share, by contrast, declined after the implementation
of the FERA on January 1, 1974, and ultimately collapsed in 1977, when
it decided to withdraw from India.
The third goal of the Government of India's computer policy was to
acquire and to fabricate technologically sophisticated computer systems
One indicator of the technological status of a developing country's
computer base is the time in years taken to introduce the latest com-
puter technology. The difference in years between a computer model's
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Table 3
Computer Market Structure in India, 1960-1980
(Systems installed, by period, in absolute numbers and
percentage shares)
Pre-Policy Pre--FERA Pre-Withdrawal Post-W:Lthdrawal
Period Peiriod Pelriod Peiriod
1960-1966 1967--1968 1973--1977 1978--1980
No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%)
IBM 31 73.8 106 73.0 6 3.1
ICL 2 4.7 17 11.7 19 9.9 20 2.0
ECIL 5 3.4 77 40.3 98 10.2
HCL 390 40.5
DCM 265 27.5
I DM 17 1.8
ORG 70 7.3
Source: Joseph M. Grieco, "Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's
Experience with the International Computer Industry," in
Theodore H. Moran, ed. , Multinational Corporations (Lexington,
Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1985), pp. 55-81.
Key: ICL - International Computers Limited
ECIL - Electronics Corporation of India Limited
HCL - Hindustan Computers Limited
DCM - DCM Dataproducts, a subsidiary of Delhi Cloth Mills
IDM - International Data Machines
ORG - Operations Research Group
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introduction in the United States and the same model's introduction in
India is one such indicator.
Grieco, in his extensive study of the Indian computer industry,
determined that India's technological lag increased during the
1967-1972 period when compared to the 1960-1967 pre-policy period. As
indicated in Table 4, the average lag of the 33 systems introduced
during the 1960-1966 pre-policy period was 4.4 years. This lag period
increased to 8.3 years for the 126 systems introduced during the
1967-1972 pre-FERA period. However, as indicated in Table 4, this
trend was reversed during the 1973-1977 period. The increase in the
lag during the 1967-1972 period was a result of the manufacturing
activities of IBM and ICL in India. They imported second-hand com-
puter systems, reconditioned these units, and then leased or sold them
to Indian users. Later, after the mid-1970s, the technological lag
was reduced through direct imports of foreign computer systems.
A second measure of the technological sophistication of the com-
puter systems manufactured in -India, used by Grieco, is the cost-per-
bit of main memory used by the central processing unit. A decreasing
cost-per-bit of main memory is indicative of advanced technology. The
IBM-1401 was the major system fabricated in India during the 1967-1972
period. The Systems 360/30 and 360/40 that IBM hoped would succeed
the System 1401 during the early and late 1970s are used for com-
parison. The System 360/40 has the lowest cost-per-bit of main
memory, as indicated in Table 5.
Based on the above factors, India appears to have made very little
progress in achieving its policy objectives during the years 1967-1972.
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Table 4
Technology Lag of Foreign Computers in India, 1960-1980
Pre-Policy Pre-FERA Pre-Withdrawal Post -Withdrawal
Period Period Period Period
1960-1966 1967-1972 1973-1977 1978-1980
33 126 95 87
145 1049 351 231
4.4 8.3 3.7 2.6
Number of Systems
Total Lag (years)
Average Lag (years)
Source: Joseph M. Grieco, "Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's
Experience with the International Computer Industry," in
Theodore H. Moran, ed. , Multinational Corporations (Lexington,
Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1985), pp. 55-81.
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Table 5
Cost-per-bit of Main Memory of Selected IBM and Indian Computers
Company IBM ECIL DCM
System 1401 360/30 360/40 TDC-312 TDC-316 Galaxy 11
Year Introduced I960" 1965 1965 1974 1975 1978
Cost-per-bit .93 .32 .21 .25 .14 .06
(in dollars)
Source: Joseph M. Grieco, "Between Dependency and Autonomy: India's
Experience with the International Computer Industry," in
Theodore H. Moran, ed., Multinational Corporations (Lexington,
Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1985), pp. 55-81.
Key: ECIL - Electronics Corporation of India Limited
DCM - DCM Dataproducts
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First, little if any success was achieved in increasing Indian par-
ticipation in the ownership and control of foreign computer sub-
sidiaries operating in the country. Second, only a very small portion
of needs of the domestic market was satisfied by Indian computer
firms. Lastly, very little access to the latest computer technology
had been secured by the Government of India.
As a result, India derived several benefits from IBM's operations.
First, the foreign capital invested by IBM was an important supplement
to Indian capital and was needed to foster the planned or desired rate
of growth. Second, IBM's investment in India added to national income,
encouraged development of ancillary industries, and created jobs in
India. Third, the Indian operations of IBM generated tax revenues to
help meet government expenditures. Fourth, there was the potential
for export generation through diffusion of advanced technology. These
exports help to reduce the foreign exchange deficit and augment India's
foreign exchange reserves.
Offsetting these benefits were diverse costs arising from IBM's
operations in India. First, there was the outflow of dividends,
profits, management and royalty fees, interest on loans, and other
remittances by IBM through the intra-company billing system. Second,
IBM's dominant position stifled the growth of Indian enterprises in
the computer industry and lead to a dependence on foreign firms in a
strategic sector. Third, IBM successfully competed for and used
scarce local capital, thereby slowing the growth of Indian firms in
the computer industry. Indian computer firms, competing with IBM, did
find it difficult to attract capital, skilled manpower, and raw
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materials. Fourth, local research and development activities suffered
as local entrepreneurs jumped on the bandwagon and used foreign tech-
nology to compete effectively with IBM. Fifth, the technology trans-
ferred by IBM was obsolete or of a type that could be developed in
India.
Having examined the costs and benefits to both IBM and India
during the pre-withdrawal period, IBM's performance during the post-
withdrawal period is examined next. A comparison is then made of
IBM's performance during the pre- and post-withdrawal periods.
Post-Withdrawal Performance of IBM . The decision to withdraw from
the Indian market may appear, at first glance, to be the appropriate
response to the policy directives of the Government of India. From
the standpoint of IBM, the Indian subsidiary contributed only 0.07
percent to IBM's total net income. The sacrifice of this income was
more than offset by the retention of control over its technology.
'
A major concern at the time was the setting of a precedent by
giving in to the demands of the Government of India. With a strong
emphasis on research and development, IBM insisted and secured 100
percent ownership in its overseas subsidiaries. However, in 1977,
IBM's organizational and control practices were challenged by Nigeria,
Indonesia, and India. Nigeria and India insisted on equity participa-
tion in the local IBM subsidiaries. Indonesia asked for control over
the marketing operations of the local IBM subsidiary. IBM officials
were concerned that complying with the policy directives of the
Government of India would set a precedent. This could lead to similar
demands by other developing and industrial countries in the future.
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Taking a long-term perspective, however, IBM's withdrawal from
India created an immediate void and opened the market to potential
competitors. Many computer companies carved out a niche for them-
selves in the Indian computer market. Brand loyalty suffered as IBM
users were induced to try alternative brands in the absence of IBM
products and found that these new brands met their needs. The inroads
made by domestic and overseas computer firms would pose a challenge to
IBM in the future. These competitors have established manufacturing
operations, distribution networks, and maintenance and service facili-
ties. Besides, existing satisfied users of competitive brands are
unlikely to opt for alternative brands in the future. Switching
brands would involve new systems, new procedures, new parts, and dif-
ficulty in network integration. Given these problems, reentry into
the Indian market would be a difficult challenge.
Moreover, IBM has relinquished a strategic base for serving the
rapidly growing Indian as well as Asian computer markets. With the
maturing of U.S. and Western computer markets, computer firms are
scrambling to establish a beachhead in the new and rapidly growing
computer markets. Market development and product development are both
necessary to sustain their growth. Computer firms are scrambling to
gain a strong foothold in attractive new markets for both offensive
and defensive strategic purposes. Thus, from a long-term strategic
perspective, the decision to withdraw from India may haunt them in
future years.
Based on the above discussion, it appears that the costs incurred
by IBM in withdrawing from the Indian market outweigh the benefits
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realized. Thus, IBM appears to have fared worse during the post-
withdrawal period. Recognizing the importance of participating in the
rapid growth of the Indian computer market, IBM has actively sought
new business and secured several orders for computer systems in India
in recent months.
Having assessed the performance of IBM, an attempt is now made to
analyze the costs and benefits to India during the post-withdrawal
period.
Post-Withdrawal Performance of India . After the withdrawal of IBM
from India, Burroughs and ICL consolidated their operations. However,
the major development during this period was the emergence of several
Indian systems-engineering firms that were not under the control of
the Government of India.
In addition, three other Indian computer firms were designing and
assembling systems. The first of these Indian computer firms, Hindustan
Computers Limited, was a joint venture between a private Indian firm
and the Uttar Pradesh state government. The second computer firm, DCM
Dataproducts, was a subsidiary of Delhi Cloth Mills. Finally, the
third computer firm, the Operations Research Group, was a subsidiary
of Sarabhai Enterprises. A fourth Indian enterprise, International
Data Machines, was founded by former IBM employees with the assistance
of IBM. This computer firm marketed and serviced a microsystem
designed and assembled by the National Radio and Electronics Company,
a subsidiary of Tata Enterprises. (National Radio and Electronics
Company and Tata-Burroughs were two separate enterprises.)
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These Indian computer firms had carved out a niche for themselves
by the end of the decade. Further, they provided considerable employ-
ment potential. In 1980, the computer division of the Electronics
Corporation of India Limited had approximately 1000 employees. A
total of approximately 600 people were employed by Tata-Burroughs and
International Computers Limited. The new Indian computer enterprises,
Hindustan Computers Limited, DCM Dataproducts, the Operations Research
Group subsidiary of Sarabhai Enterprises, and International Data
Machines, together had about 1900 employees.
Based on the above developments, the Government of India achieved
effective Indian participation in the ownership and control of the
local units of foreign computer firms. Furthermore, new Indian com-
puter firms emerged to fill the void created by the departure of IBM
from India.
During the late 1970s, Indian computer enterprises as a group con-
tinued to grow and become a major force in the Indian computer market.
The four new Indian computer firms surged ahead and overtook the
Government of India's Electronics Corporation of India Limited.
Hence, during the post-withdrawal period, the Government of India suc-
ceeded in attaining its second policy objective of self-sufficiency in
the Indian computer industry.
On the technology front, India's technology lag continued to
narrow during the post-withdrawal period in the late 1970s. As
depicted in Table 4, the average lag of the 87 computer systems intro-
duced had decreased to 2.6 years during the 1978-1980 post-withdrawal
period. This average lag of 2.6 years was lower than the average lag
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periods of 4.4 years, 8.3 years and 3.7 years registered during
earlier periods.
The cost-per-bit of main memory also declined during the post-
withdrawal period, signifying an advance in technological sophistica-
tion of computer systems manufactured in India. The Government of
India's Electronics Corporation of India Limited produced the System
TDC-312 and the System TDC-316 during the post-FERA and subsequent
periods (middle and late 1970s). DCM Dataproducts fabricated the
Galaxy 11 System during the post-withdrawal period (late 1970s and
thereafter)
.
As indicated in Table 5, the cost-per-bit of main memory of both
the TDC-312 and TDC-316 was lower than that of the IBM 1401, the
360/30, and the 360/40, fabricated during the pre-withdrawal period.
This indicates that the Indian computer systems, fabricated during the
post-FERA pre-withdrawal period (1973-1977), were more advanced than
those manufactured by IBM during the pre-FERA period (1967-1972). The
Indian computer systems were even more advanced than the System 360
that IBM had proposed to succeed the System 1401.
The systems manufactured in India at the end of the 1970s con-
tinued to improve technologically. In 1978, the cost-per-bit of main
memory of an ECIL TDC-316 was about $.14, and that of the DCM Galaxy 11
was approximately $.06. The most impressive gains were achieved by
the new Indian computer firms rather than the government-owned com-
puter enterprise Electronics Corporation of India Limited.
Based on the above factors, India appears to have made some
progress in achieving its policy objectives during the years 1967-1972.
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First, success was achieved in increasing Indian participation in the
ownership and control of foreign computer subsidiaries operating in
the country. Second, Indian computer firms satisfied the majority of
the needs of the domestic market. Finally, Indian computer firms had
decreased the technology lag period and reduced the cost-per-bit of
main memory by achieving access to the latest computer technology.
Summary and Implications
The primary objective of foreign direct investment is to induce
the transfer of technology and capital. Technology and capital
transfer are considered prerequisites to achieve technological and
industrial development and to attain self-sufficiency.
The Government of India opted in favor of achieving self-sufficiency
in the computer industry through domestic development. Foreign direct
investment was used as a catalyst in the process of industrial devel-
opment. The recent withdrawal of IBM from India highlights this quest
of attaining the twin objectives of technological development and
self-sufficiency with respect to the computer industry.
This study examines the costs and benefits to both IBM and India
arising from the Government of India's decision to deny IBM 100 per-
cent foreign equity and IBM's subsequent decision to withdraw from
India. The costs incurred and benefits realized by IBM and India are
explored during both the pre- and post-withdrawal periods.
Data on all the costs and benefits to both parties arising out of
IBM's withdrawal from India are difficult to obtain. However, based
on an analysis of the major factors pertinent to the case, the results
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are mixed. The Government of India appears to have succeeded in
securing effective participation in the ownership and control of
domestic operations of foreign computer firms. In addition, it
appears to have succeeded in achieving self-sufficiency as well as
advanced technology by Indian computer enterprises. IBM, on the other
hand, is again actively seeking and securing new contracts in the
Indian computer market. Only time will tell whether IBM will resume
manufacturing operations and reestablish the strong foothold it once
had in India.
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